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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Allan Torson appeals from his conviction for felony DUI. On appeal he
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Torson with felony DUI. (R., pp. 24-25.) Torson filed a motion
to suppress “all statements he made at the scene and evidence seized,” contending “law
enforcement unlawfully extended his detention.” (R., pp. 32-42.)
The district court found the following facts in relation to the motion to suppress:
An officer stopped the car Torson was driving for an expired registration at about 4:30 in
the afternoon. (R., p. 72.) Torson admitted not having a driver’s license and provided an
expired proof of insurance. (Id.) Torson seemed nervous. (Id.) The officer “called for a
drug dog and additional officers as he walked back to his patrol car.” (Id.)
At the patrol car the officer “ran Defendant’s information and wrote citations for
having an expired registration and invalid driver’s license.” (Id.) A canine officer and a
backup officer arrived while the initial officer “was writing the citations.” (Id.) The
backup officer had Torson exit the car and sit on a curb. (Id.) As he did so he “noticed
Defendant had ‘pinpoint pupils’ and red, watery eyes” that he recognized to be a
“physiologic response to a narcotic.” (Id.) The officer asked Torson whether he was taking
any medication and Torson stated he was on antibiotics “for a pulled tooth,” which
conversation was overheard by the initial officer. (R., pp. 72-73.)
The initial officer finished the citations “[a]pproximately twelve minutes after the
initial stop.” (Id.) Rather than immediately delivering the citations, the initial officer
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inspected Torson’s eyes for himself and likewise concluded their appearance could be a
result of narcotics use. (Id.) Believing that taking an antibiotic would not explain Torson’s
constricted pupils, he questioned Torson, who then admitted taking a narcotic as well as an
antibiotic. (Id.) At this point the officer also smelled alcohol. (Id.) The initial officer then
employed field sobriety testing, which Torson failed, and breath testing, which revealed a
BAC of .09/.09. (Id.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 71-76.) The district court
reasoned that the officer who conducted the initial (unchallenged) traffic stop had
reasonable suspicion to inquire about whether Torson had used a narcotic prior to driving
based on seeing Torson had constricted pupils and red eyes, something the officer
recognized as a physiological sign of narcotic use, and hearing Torson state that he was
taking an antibiotic after having a tooth pulled. (R., pp. 72-73, 75.) That interaction led to
an admission that Torson had in fact taken a narcotic and discovery of the smell of alcohol
on Torson’s person. (Id.)
Torson entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of
his suppression motion. (R., p. 80.) The district court entered judgment and Torson timely
appealed. (R., pp. 92-99.)
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ISSUE
Torson states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Torson’s motion to
suppress.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Torson failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to inquire whether Torson had taken a narcotic?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To
Inquire Whether Torson Had Taken A Narcotic
A.

Introduction
The district court found the initial officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate

whether Torson had taken a narcotic based on Torson having “pinpoint” pupils; red, watery
eyes; and Torson’s statement that he had a tooth pulled and was taking antibiotics. (R., pp.
73-76.) The court concluded that even if the constricted pupils alone were not enough, the
additional facts rendered an investigation into whether Torson had taken a narcotic
reasonable. (Id.)
On appeal Torson contends that constricted pupils alone are not enough to create
reasonable suspicion and “more additional factors were needed to create reasonable
suspicion in his case.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) This argument fails for two reasons.
First, a physiological sign of narcotics use is enough alone to create reasonable suspicion
of narcotics use and, second, even if it was not alone enough the officer also had (1) unusual
nervousness, (2) red and watery eyes, and (3) Torson’s statement that he had a tooth
removed and was taking medications (specifically antibiotics) for it. All of these facts
together amount to reasonable suspicion to extend the detention long enough to ask if
Torson was taking a narcotic along with the antibiotic.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial

court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho

4

493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). “Thus, determinations of
reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact that support a
determination of reasonable suspicion are reviewed for clear error.” State v. Perez, 164
Idaho 626, 628, 434 P.3d 801, 803 (2019) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Torson
has not claimed clear error in the district court’s factual findings. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
6-11.) Thus, the only issue before this court is the de novo application of the law to the
facts found by the district court.
C.

The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Inquire About Whether Torson Had
Used A Narcotic
“Under the Fourth Amendment, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than

probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” Perez, 164 Idaho
at 628, 434 P.3d at 803 (quotation marks omitted). “To determine whether such reasonable
articulable suspicion existed, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances which
were known to the officer before the detention occurred.” State v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35,
39, 368 P.3d 655, 659 (2016). “Although it must be more than a mere hunch, the level of
suspicion required to create a reasonable suspicion is less than is necessary for probable
cause and considerably less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v.
Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 305, 336 P.3d 232, 238 (2014). “Further, while conduct might be
explained by another cause, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
recognized that reasonable suspicion need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”
Perez, 164 Idaho at 628, 434 P.3d at 803 (quotation marks omitted).
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In this case the officers observed “pinpoint pupils” which are a “physiologic
response to a narcotic.” (R., p. 72.) Although there may be other possible explanations for
why Torson would have extremely contracted pupils during daylight hours, the possibility
it was because he had used a narcotic was more than a hunch.

It was therefore

constitutionally reasonable to extend the traffic stop to conduct further investigation of
whether Torson was under the influence of a narcotic and was in fact safe to drive the car.
Even if the fact of “pinpoint pupils” alone was not enough to reasonably suspect
the possibility that Torson had used a narcotic, that was not the only fact in the totality of
circumstances known to the officers.

Additional facts include Torson’s unusual

nervousness, that Torson’s eyes were also red and watery, and Torson’s explanation that
he had recently had dental work and was taking an antibiotic. (R., p. 72.) As determined
by the district court, these factors in conjunction make suspicion Torson had taken a
narcotic reasonable. (R., p. 75.) Although nervousness alone does not create reasonable
suspicion, it is properly considered. Moreover, although Torson explained his red and
watery eyes, such explanation does not negate consideration of this fact. Finally, Torson’s
explanation for his “pinpoint pupils” being the result of antibiotics from a dental procedure
is quite suspicious, because the recent dental procedure would be one reason why Torson
might be taking a narcotic as a painkiller and because antibiotics were not, in the officer’s
experience, a reason for the constricted pupils. (R., pp. 72-73.) The totality of the
circumstances in this case included “pinpoint pupils,” a known physiologic response to a
narcotic; unusual nervousness; red and watery eyes; and Torson’s statements that he had a
tooth extraction for which he was taking antibiotics. This totality made suspicion he had
taken a narcotic reasonable. Investigation based on this reasonable suspicion led quickly
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to evidence Torson had in fact taken a narcotic for pain from the tooth extraction and
additional evidence he was under the influence. The district court correctly denied the
motion to suppress.
Torson argues the district court erred. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) He first cites
State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 616, 329 P.3d 391, 398 (Ct. App. 2014), for the
proposition that “the presence of bloodshot and glassy eyes is not alone sufficient to
provide reasonable suspicion.” Of course in this case Torson’s red and watery eyes were
not the only, or even most significant, evidence possessed by the officer.
Moreover, Torson’s casual bait and switch of bloodshot and glassy eyes for
“pinpoint pupils” is not well taken. Bloodshot and glassy eyes are more common and could
happen for many reasons, only one of which is alcohol consumption. By contrast, pinpoint
pupils are far rarer, and narcotic use is the most likely explanation. In a word, “pinpoint
pupils” are more suspicious than glassy and bloodshot eyes.
Finally, even if “pinpoint pupils” are analogous to bloodshot and glassy eyes, the
totality of the circumstances in this case still shows reasonable suspicion. The Court stated
in Perez-Jungo that “few additional facts are needed beyond bloodshot and glassy eyes to
provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity.” Id. Here, in
addition to red and watery eyes the officers observed “pinpoint pupils,” nervousness, and
Torson’s statement about a recent tooth extraction for which he was taking antibiotics. The
district court’s ruling that this constituted additional facts is consistent with, and not
contrary to, Perez-Jungo.
Torson’s argument based on State v. Hogan, 868 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 2015), is
likewise unpersuasive. In that case the district court discounted the officer’s testimony

7

about the defendant’s “pupils being restricted.” Id. at 131-32. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court concluded that “the State could have made a valid case that Deputy Smith had
reasonable suspicion to pursue field sobriety tests with Patrick Hogan,” but that case “was
not made, and, consequently, Judge Day’s ruling on this point was not error.” Id. at 132.
Rather than a hard and fast rule that constricted pupils would never alone create reasonable
suspicion, the Hogan court stated that it could, but that the state would have to first
convince a factfinder of the significance of those observations. Unlike in Hogan, the
district court’s unchallenged factual findings in this case support its conclusion the officers
had reasonable suspicion of narcotics use.
The totality of the circumstances found by the district court included “pinpoint
pupils,” a “physiologic response to a narcotic”; red, watery eyes; unusual nervousness; and
Torson’s statement that he had a tooth pulled and was taking antibiotics. (R., pp. 73-76.)
The “pinpoint pupils” alone was enough to make suspicion of narcotic use reasonable. In
combination with the other circumstances, the district court correctly held officers had
reasonable suspicion to further investigate the possibility of narcotic use.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment.
DATED this 7th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
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